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Avian influenza viruses are shared among wild birds and sometimes are shed 
from wild birds to domestic poultry and backyard domestic animals. Usually avian 
influenza viruses infect wild birds as asymptomatic or low pathogenesis and are 
stocked in birds, water, and soil. Accumulation of genetic changes of influenza 
viruses in hosts diversities the pathogenesis to hosts described as highly pathogenic 
avian influenza viruses and low pathogenic avian influenza viruses. Highly patho-
genic avian influenza viruses being categorized among influenza A subtype viruses 
(H5, H7, H9) and different from low pathogenic avian influenza viruses cause 
severe illness and sudden increased deaths of wild birds, chicken, or other poultry. 
These infect from avian to humans. The adequate approaches of information and 
action for appearance of HPAI and LPAI viral infections in flock may prohibit the 
outbreak of avian to humans, which are mostly including quarantine of the infected 
area of the flock from surrounding laboratory tests for HPAI and LPAI viruses in 
early illness and antiviral treatments in humans.
Keywords: zoonotic infection, antigenic drift, antigenic shift,  
influenza A virus strain
1. Introduction
There are four types of influenza viruses, types A, B, C, and D, in the world. 
Influenza virus infection is zoonotic and sometimes restricted to specific spe-
cies. Influenza A and B viruses mainly cause disease among humans, swine, and 
avian. Influenza C virus infects humans and swine but does not cause severe 
disease, and its infection to humans is rarely reported [1]. Influenza D viruses 
affect swine and cattle and are not known to cause sickness to humans [1]. 
Influenza B viruses infect humans and avian and cause epidemic in the limiting 
mild disease [2]. Influenza B virus is concerned about seasonal viral infection 
but not endemic or pandemic. Influenza A virus is different from other types of 
influenza viruses about the wide infectious ranges of host and severity of dis-
ease. Influenza A viruses are theoretically classified into thousands of different 
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antigenic subtypes by the combinations of the main viral antigens: hemag-
glutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) [3]. Recently 18 different HA subtypes 
and 11 different NA subtypes have been identified [4, 5]. Influenza A viruses are 
classified from H1N1 to H18N11 and are called as avian influenza virus, swine 
influenza virus, or other types of animal influenza viruses depending on original 
infectious host. Humans, swine, and avian are infective host of influenza A 
virus, but infectious influenza A viral subtypes among intraspecies are restricted 
by the binding affinity of the HA protein to sialyloligosaccharides (oligosac-
charides containing terminal silica acids linked to galactose) on host cell surface 
glycoprotein or glycolipids [6]. Influenza A viruses cause normally self-limited 
disease (asymptomatic or mild) and are shared with humans and many dif-
ferent animals. Most subtypes of influenza A viruses are primarily reserved in 
aquatic birds, are distinct from human influenza A viruses, and do not easily 
transmit to human due to host species barriers [7]. Zoonotic infection between 
humans and animals or interspecies of infection of influenza A viruses makes 
viral evolutions which can help to surmount species barriers [8]. Avian influenza 
viruses transmit from aquatic birds to poultry and change virus properties and 
result in change pathogenesis ranging from mild disease to severe disease with 
high death rates in host species. According to these phenomena, avian influenza 
viruses cause severe disease and high death rate in host, which are called as 
highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses, and avian influenza viruses 
result in mild disease or asymptomatic infection to host, which are called as low 
pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) viruses. A virus is defined as HPAI or LPAI 
by its ability to cause disease and mortality in intravenously inoculated young 
chickens in the laboratory or by its possession of molecular characteristic fea-
tures associated with HPAI viruses. Avian, swine, and other zoonotic influenza 
infections in humans may happen on the condition of the successful transmis-
sion with the sufficient contact between donor and recipient species, successful 
species jumps of influenza viruses, the influenza viral complex adaptations, and 
achieved sustained transmission in a new species [7]. Those may cause several 
ranges of disease in humans depending on viral factors and human factors [9]. 
HPAI virus infections have been monitored from avian to humans and caused 
the endemic disease of high fatality rate [10]. HPAI viruses may cause pandemic 
from endemic on the condition of no effective protection for wide shedding of 
HPAI viruses. Monitoring of disease severity of avian and human influenza A 
virus infection could prevent the severe damage to the society from the emerging 
infectious disease of influenza A viruses [9].
2. Evolution of influenza A viruses
2.1 Antigenic drift
Influenza viruses cause annual recurrent epidemics in humans, which approxi-
mately result in 3–5 million cases of severe illness and 250,000–500,000 deaths 
worldwide [11]. Most of these were occurred by influenza A and B viruses. Especially 
influenza A viruses change viral surface glycoproteins HA and NA by accumulations 
of point mutations in HA and NA genes and escape from human immunity called 
as antigenic drift, which may occur as seasonal influenza epidemic. But antigenic 
drift does not evolve virulence of influenza A viruses which cause severe disease 
in humans [12]. Seasonal influenza viral infections are limiting disease and mild, 
which cause severe disease and death by factors of host immune conditions. This 
does not mean that there is no necessity of treatment of anti-influenza viral therapy 
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for seasonal influenza infections. The adequate diagnosis and treatment for seasonal 
influenza infection diminish severe illness and subsequent death from seasonal 
influenza infections and lead to awareness of emerging infectious disease [13].
2.2 Avian influenza A H5N1 viruses
In 1997 HPAI (H5N1) viruses occurred among wild birds and caused an out-
break in poultry and sporadic human infection in Hong Kong [14]. This was firstly 
identified as the crossover of avian-human species barrier and resulted in 18 infected 
individuals and 6 of 18 patients died [15]. Zoonotic infection of avian influenza 
virus H5N1 has been widely spread from Asia to Europe and Africa, which has been 
endemic in some countries and caused outbreaks resulting in millions of poultry 
infections, several hundreds of human infectious cases, and many human deaths 
since 2003 [16]. Avian influenza virus H5N1 causes a disease which has aggressive 
symptoms different from a mild disease of seasonal influenza virus infection in 
humans [9]. HA is a surface viral protein which binds to and uses sialic acid-contain-
ing molecules as receptors for viral infection to multiple cells. Avian influenza virus 
strains circulated in waterfowl contain HAs with preference for binding to sialic 
acids linked to the rest of the sugar by an α2–3 linkage. In contrast, HAs from human 
influenza virus strains show enhanced binding to α2–6-linked sialic acids [17]. 
Seasonal influenza viruses cause symptoms of upper respiratory infection by cor-
relation with an abundance of α2–6-linked sialic acids in the upper respiratory tract 
of humans [18]. More detailed analysis of H5N1 infection showed an abundance of 
α2–3-linked sialic acids in the lower respiratory tract of humans, and the explanation 
of severe disease of the lung was done, as pneumonia and respiratory failure in H5N1 
infection [19]. In addition to an abundance of avian influenza viral receptor in lower 
respiratory tract in humans, the autopsy reports of H5N1-infected patients revealed 
avian influenza virus infection intra and extra lung concluding the brain, intestine, 
heart, spleen, lymphoid tissue, kidney, and placenta by applying immunohisto-
chemistry (IHC) with monoclonal antibodies to hemagglutinin (HA) and nucleo-
capsid protein (NP) and/or in situ hybridization with sense and antisense probes 
to HA and NP to detect viral antigens and genomic sequences in various organs of 
H5N1 cases and RT-PCR and nucleic acid sequence-based amplification H5 detection 
assays [20–25]. HAs with multiple residues at the cleavage site of precursor HAs that 
can be activated by ubiquitous intracellular proteases may cause systemic infections; 
on the other hand, HAs with a single arginine residue at the cleavage site of precur-
sor HAs that can only be cleaved by extracellular trypsin-like proteases present in the 
upper respiratory and gastrointestinal tracts may give rise to local infections [26]. 
The disease severity in human cases varies from mild to extremely severe; mutations 
of HA may always be related to the ability of receptor binding but not the virulence 
of viruses, which imply that there are other factors responsible for the virulence of 
H5N1 influenza viruses in humans [27]. As the characterization of avian influenza 
A H5N1, the analysis of H5N1 infections showed the deletion of 19 amino acids of 
the stalk region in NA protein that cleaves and separates the HA of progeny virions 
from the sialic acid-containing receptors on the surface of the infected host cells, in 
which they were generated [14, 28]. This deletion may play a role in the transmis-
sion of virus across species [29]. The polymerase complex is composed of three viral 
polymerase proteins  
(PB1, PB2, and PA) involved in viral RNA synthesis. In the polymerase complex 
of avian influenza viruses, glutamic acid to lysine substitution at position 627 of 
PB2 was isolated but not a prerequisite for high virulence in humans [30]. The 1918 
pandemic was called as Spanish flu and proposed that the 1918 virus was not a reas-
sorted virus (like those of the 1957 and 1968 pandemics), but more likely an entirely 
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avian-like virus that has adapted to humans. But the 1918 influenza virus was ana-
lyzed as 10 amino acids change the polymerase complex including the lysine residue 
at position 627 [31]. These mutations require more investigation for the precursors of 
a new influenza pandemic. PB1-F2 is a small mitochondrial protein that is encoded 
on an open reading frame of PB1 [32]. This open reading frame is highly conserved 
in avian influenza isolates [33]. The reconstructed 1918 influenza virus linked to the 
PB1-F2 protein and recombinant virus with a single mutation in the PB1-F2 protein 
[serine (S) instead of asparagine (N) at position 66] of H5N1 (Hk/97) increase 
viral pathogenicity [34, 35]. PB1-F2 may induce apoptosis of immune cells and 
an insufficient adaptive immune response [35]. The NS proteins (NS1 and NS2) 
are viral proteins, and NS1 has multiple functions including splicing and nuclear 
export of cellular mRNA as well as stimulation of translation [36]. The NS1 protein 
is crucial for evading the innate immune response of the host by inhibiting the 
antiviral response mediated by type I interferons [37]. The presence of glutamic acid 
at position 92 of NS1 has been investigated to be a prerequisite for the resistance to 
antiviral cytokines considering the results of severe disease induction by inoculation 
of reassortant influenza virus (H1N1) bearing the NS gene of the H5N1/97 virus to 
pigs and the lack of glutamic acid at position of the NS1 protein in the recent human 
and avian isolates [38–41]. Two PDZ ligand (PL) sequence motifs (a Glu-Pro-Glu-
Val (EPEV), a Glu-Ser-Glu-Val (ESEV)) were detected in viruses isolated during 
1997 but not in viruses after 1997 as a potential codominants of virulence disrupting 
several PDZ-domain protein-mediated pathways for cell signaling [33].
M1 and M2 are matrix proteins, and M2 is a 97-residue single-pass membrane 
protein with its N-terminus directed toward the outside of the virus. It determines 
proton selectivity and unidirectional conductance of the channel by mutagenesis 
studies [42]. A serine to asparagine substitution at residue 31 of M2 protein is 
associated with resistance to adamantanes which were used for therapy of influenza 
A virus infections [43]. On the other hand, M2 protein is suggested to be a candidate 
for the adaptation of the virus to a new host in addition to PB1-F2 from a study of 
Thai and Indonesian isolates [43].
2.3 Avian influenza A H7N9 viruses
Avian influenza viruses sometimes infect poultry as LPAI, and there is no con-
cern to LPAI, but even LPAI suddenly caused the sporadic infection among humans 
which started on February 19, 2013, in Shanghai [44]. There was no epidemic of 
severe disease in poultry infections with H7N9 before human infections with H7N9. 
In April 2013, the number of human cases of H7N9 virus infections increased 
significantly, reaching 125 confirmed cases in China, which was suggested to be 
derived from contacting with poultry and/or contaminated environments in farm-
ers’ markets with live birds [45]. After closure of live birds’ markets, the number 
of new human cases infected with H7N9 declined rapidly. But the second wave of 
human infections with H7N9 virus started again owing to the lower fall tempera-
ture and reopening of poultry markets in the fall of 2013. This wave is characterized 
by the extensive geographic spread from the province of Eastern China to Southern 
China and a large number of human infections with H7N9 (440 human infections 
and 122 associated death of 440 as of May 16, 2014) [46]. For the protection of 
widespread of H7H9, two strategies composed of suspending farmers’ markets with 
live birds and stopping the transport for trading of live birds carrying the virus were 
applied by provincial and Chinese authorities [47, 48]. These measures controlled 
the more spread of H7N9 virus infections in China, but the potential benefits 
of public health measures should be balanced against the potentially significant 
societal and economic costs [49]. The lack of protective antibodies in human against 
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H7N9 virus leads to the result of influenza pandemic in humans, nevertheless of 
zoonotic infection of poultry to humans [50]. During October 1, 2016–August 7, 
2017, the largest fifth epidemic of Asian H7N9 infections since 2013 was reported as 
759 human infections including 281 deaths [51]. The total of human infections has 
reached to 1557 human infections and at least 605 deaths (39%) during March 31, 
2013–August 7, 2017 [51]. Fourteen clusters of two or three persons with H7N9 hap-
pened during the fifth epidemic Asian H7N9 that was explained in association with 
wider geographic spread and higher prevalence of Asian virus among poultry and 
not as a result of any increased incidence of poultry to humans or human-to-human 
spread [51]. In the genesis of H7N9, H7 of H7N9 is derived from H7N3 viruses 
isolated among ducks in Eastern China in 2010–2011, and N9 of H7N9 is derived 
from avian H2N9 and/or H11N9 viruses isolated among wild migratory birds along 
the East Asian flyway [50, 52]. Both of them are Eurasian lineage of avian viruses, 
and reassortment of gene (so-called as antigenic shift) may happen and produce the 
possible precursor of H7N9 virus. Six viral genes except H7 and N9 of H7N9 virus 
likely originated from chicken H9N2 sub-lineages 1 and 2 circulating in Eastern 
China [50, 52]. Antigenic shift is suggested to form H7N9 virus during the genera-
tion and evolution of viruses. In the analysis of H7N9, viral sequences revealed that 
H7N9 virus possesses leucine or isoleucine at position 226 of HA which binds to 
both sialic acid-α2,3-galactose (avian-type receptor) and sialic acid-α2,6-galactose 
(human -type receptor) [53]. This may mean as the avian virus infection to humans 
in addition to expression of sialic acid-α2,6-galactose in the upper respiratory tract 
and sialic acid-α2,3-galactose in the lower respiratory tract in humans [19, 21–25]. 
According to PB2 protein of H7N9, sequence analysis revealed that many isolated 
H7N9 viruses encode lysine at position 627 of PB2 [54]. This substitution of glu-
tamic acid (E) to lysine (K) of position 627 of PB2 (E627K mutation) may enable 
avian viruses to adapt to efficient replication at 33 and 37°C of human temperature 
lower than original avian host temperature (41°C) [55, 56]. Other mutations of 
position 627 of PB2 in these viruses have been reported and investigated [56]. The 
resistant H7N9 variants encoding the R294K mutation in NA that confers resistance 
to oseltamivir have been detected in patients treated with neuraminidase inhibitors 
(NAIs). R294K substitution was revealed as multidrug resistance with extreme osel-
tamivir resistance by the study of using protein- and virus-based assays [57]. On the 
other hand, K294 mutation of H7N9 infections was found. Compared with H7N9 
viruses containing K294 which leads to mild resistance to NAIs, R294K appeared in 
clinical course under the selective pressure of oseltamivir treatment and conferred 
not only multidrug resistance to NAIs but also decreases NA activity and impaired 
virus replication. These phenomena may explain the failure for predominance of 
R294K-mutated strains of H7N9 in this outbreak. But the drug-resistant mutations 
should be monitored vigilantly in order to help the most effective drug administra-
tion and the prevention of unnecessary loss of human lives in clinical course [57]. 
Recently LPAI H7N9 viruses have evolved to HPAI viruses and caused the increased 
morbidity and mortality in poultry, and the same phenomenon has more likely 
occurred in human infections [51].
2.4 Avian influenza A H7N7 viruses
Outbreaks of HPAI virus infections mostly originate from endemic LPAI viral 
strains of H5 and H7 subtypes among wild waterfowl. These LPAI virus strains 
can transmit from waterfowl to poultry and change virulence to HPA virus 
among poultry [58]. In the Netherlands, an epidemic of HPAI virus H7N7 infec-
tion occurred in 2003 that resulted in 255 affected flocks and culling (killing and 
removing of infected poultry flocks) of 30 million birds [59]. Control measures 
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were applied to HPAI virus infection in poultry leading to the potential start of 
human influenza pandemic, such as culling and banning the movement of infected 
flocks and tracing and screening of the infection which were implemented, fol-
lowed by preemptive culling of flocks in a 1-km zone around the infected flock. In 
this HPAI viral epidemic in poultry, 86 poultry workers and 3 household contacts 
were identified to be affected with H7N7 by RT-PCR, and the main symptom of 
this infection was conjunctivitis (83/89 persons) and one fatal case happened 
[60, 61]. Since 2006–2011 LPAI virus infection in the Netherlands (2006) and in 
Germany (2011) and HPAI virus infection in England (2008) and in Spain (2009), 
H7N7 viral infections were reported. These show the difficulty in the elimination 
of epidemic avian influenza viral infection from the endemic avian influenza virus 
infection among wild waterfowls. As additional measures, vaccination for poultry 
in outbreaks of H7N7 significantly reduced the excretion of viruses, which may 
reduce virus spread in infected areas and the risk of human exposure to viruses, in 
Italy (2000) [62]. Compared with the H7N1 and H7N3 episodes leading no bird to 
human transmission in Italy, in the genetic analysis of H7N7, HA gene of H7N7 is 
quite similar to HA genes of H7N1 and H7N3. So other mutations in NA or internal 
genes of H7N7 virus including E627K in PB2 except HA may determine the capac-
ity to replicate and cause disease in humans. Although H7N7 virus may replicate 
well in the human cells near the eyes, it may not well replicate in the human upper 
respiratory tract [61].
2.5 Avian influenza A H9N2 viruses
Influenza virus A H9N2 has been firstly known in 1966 as the infection among 
turkeys in Wisconsin. Until 1998–1999, influenza H9N2 viruses are less considered 
to be as zoonotic transmission, although this H9N2 widespread is nearly global 
including several Asian countries among from wild birds to domestic poultry 
populations [63]. H9N2 viruses are characterized as LPAI viruses that have caused 
mild disease which led to decreased egg production and deaths in poultry [64]. In 
China, natural human infections with H9N2 were firstly reported as seropositive 
cases in Guangdong province in 1998 and several cases with mild or asymptomatic 
illness in the South or mainland China and Hong Kong in 1999 [65]. H9N2 LPAI 
viruses, that were isolated from an infected human in Pakistan in 2012–2015 and in 
Northern China in 2017, have an identical amino acid residue leucine at 226 in the 
receptor binding site of HA, the C-terminus of PDZ ligand motif in NS1 (KSEI), NP 
(E372D), and L55F in the M2 protein that are mammalian host-specific markers [64, 
66]. Avian influenza H9N2 viral infections have been globally distributed as mild 
and asymptomatic infection in humans, poultry, pet birds, and other domestic ani-
mals and may trigger weak immune responses and production of low titer of anti-
body to H9N2 in humans [63, 66]. These were inducted as infections from poultry 
to humans directly or indirectly, but not as human-to-human transmission [63, 66]. 
Low rates of influenza A H9N2 viral infection in poultry-exposed individuals may 
cause an epidemic with a longer duration or a greater magnitude than if the virus 
was introduced to a completely unexposed population [67]. H9N2 also demonstrates 
its potential to efficient transmission from avian hosts and sharing genetic materials 
(e.g., internal genes) with other viruses as appearance of H7N9 and H10N8 [68, 69].
2.6  Other avian viruses in human infections: H10N8, H5N6, H7N2, H7N3,  
H6N1, and H10N7
In China in 2013, human infection of avian influenza A H10N8 virus was firstly 
reported as severe illness which resulted in death within 9 days of clinical course 
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[69]. This strain is different from others isolated from poultry and wild birds 
and reassortant of H9N2 containing genetic markers for mammalian adaptation 
and virulence in HA (A135T, S138A), M1 (N30D, T215A), NS1 (P42S), and PB2 
(E627K). This virus was sensitive to neuraminidase inhibitors (NAIs) [69].
In China in 2014, human infection of avian influenza virus was caused by H5N6 
HPAI virus following the epidemic infections of many birds’ death [70]. Until 2017, 
a total of 16 human cases infected with avian influenza H5N6 and 11 fatal cases 
of 16 cases (an overall CFR of 69%) were reported [71]. Thirteen of 16 cases had 
exposure to live poultry or live poultry markets (LPMs). Avian influenza H5N6 
viruses belonged to HA H5 genetic clade 2.3.4.4 have evolved from H5N1 and H9N2 
viruses [72], and similar H5 clade A (H5N6) viruses have been detected in wild 
birds and poultry in China, Japan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Myanmar, 
the Republic of Korea, and Vietnam [73]. Analyses of poultry and environmental 
samples indicate that the different avian influenza A H5N6 virus genotypes may 
vary by geographic regions as HPAI viruses or LPAI viruses [73].
In the United States of America (USA) in 2016, avian influenza A H7N2 infected 
one human after an outbreak of infection among cats in an animal shelter in 
New York City. This person’s infection was associated with close contact with sick 
cats affected with H7N2-isolated virus and no widespread to any other persons [74]. 
Avian influenza H7N2 viral infection to humans has been reported as the result of 
prolonged long contact with infected birds since 2002 in the USA. But the screen-
ing of more than 350 people with exposure to infected cats during this outbreak 
appeared no more human infection except one, and the risk posed by this virus to 
the public was thought to be low. Isolated H7N2 viruses in the USA are characterized 
as LPAI virus but have increased binding to sialic acid-α2,6-galactose receptor and 
reduced binding to sialic acid-α2,3-galactose receptor which has the possibility of 
human-to-human infection [75].
In Canada in 2004, a two-time outbreak of avian influenza A H7N3 viral infec-
tion happened in one farm: the first was characterized as LPAI viral infection which 
resulted in 8–16 deaths/day among 9200 chickens in a barn, and the second was 
detected as HPAI viral infection which resulted in 2000 deaths in 2 days among 
9030 chickens in an adjacent barn [76]. After the outbreaks of LPAI and HPAI virus 
infections, the examination of testing for H7N3 among approximately 2000 poultry 
farm workers and 650 workers assisted with outbreak management and control 
revealed 57 suspected and/or confirmed as avian influenza infections [76]. Only 
two confirmed patients with avian influenza A H7N3 virus had conjunctivitis and 
mild influenza-like illness cases infected with avian influenza A H7N7 virus in the 
Netherlands.
In Taiwan in 2013, a human infection with avian influenza A H6N1 was rec-
ognized as mild pneumonia and quick improvement by treated oseltamivir. A 
20-year-old woman works at a breakfast shop and had not been exposed to poultry 
or birds and no travel to China. Investigation of 36 close contacts with her cleared 
no positive tests for avian influenza A H6N1, and two poultry farms within 1 km 
from the woman’s house were investigated as the results of no H6N1 virus infection 
[77]. Avian influenza A H6N1 virus strain commonly circulates in domestic birds in 
Taiwan, and this infection happened to be found in the alert of a Taiwanese trav-
eler’s infection with epidemic avian influenza H7N9 virus in China in 2013. Genetic 
and structural analysis of isolated H6N1 virus reveals that a single nucleotide 
substitution resulting in a change from Gly to Asp at position 225 of HA (G225D) 
leads to direct interaction of Asp225 with the penultimate of Gal of the human-type 
receptor and the stabilized binding to human receptor [78]. E627K mutation in PB2 
is well known to human adaptation of avian influenza viruses but is not present in 
avian and human isolates.
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In Australia in 2010, an outbreak of LPAI H10N7 viruses was identified as 10–25 
bird’s deaths for 8–14 days, a 15% decrease of egg production, and no respiratory 
signs in affected flocks. Two of seven abattoirs who had conjunctivitis and minor 
upper respiratory tract symptoms were identified to be infected by H10N7 virus 
[79]. In Australia in 2010, surveillance for H10N7 viruses showed small numbers 
of wild waterfowl on the affected site and no infection of H10 subtypes in poultry 
around 2 km of affected farms.
2.7 Other strains of avian influenza viruses.
In addition to avian influenza strains of poultry to human infections, epidemics 
of avian influenza A strains are reported: H5N2, H5N5, and H5N8 viruses as HPAI 
viruses and H3N8, H6N6, H10N4, H10N5, H11N2, and H7N8 as occasional infection 
to mammals.
3. Transmission of species
3.1 Genes’ transport of wild birds to poultry by antigenic shift
As above, many avian influenza reasssortant viruses have emerged during viral 
transmission from wild birds (donor spices) to poultry (recipient species). LPAI 
viruses from wild birds have been reasserted with other influenza virus strains of 
poultry and changed virulence in poultry. If LPAI viruses could not adapt to new host 
of poultry, they would die out. LPAI viruses have been environmentally sustained by 
close contact to LPAI viruses among wild birds when avian influenza A virus infections 
happened in endemic countries. Host species barriers do not mean simply the biologi-
cal barriers [7]. Biological barriers between wild birds and poultry are almost the same 
in concerning about influenza binding receptor in cell membrane (α2–3-linked sialic 
acids) and replication condition in host temperature [19, 53]. In addition to biological 
barriers, interspecific interactions between wild birds (donor) and poultry (recipient), 
interactions between avian influenza viruses and poultry (recipient), and interactions 
among individuals of poultry (recipient) are considered as environmental barriers [7]. 
In consequence of surmounting these barriers, LPAI viruses have been sustained by the 
successful onward adaptation to new hosts like H7N7 viruses, H9N2 viruses and H7N9 
viruses in the present [47, 59, 64]. If humans have been in close contact to poultry 
affected with LPAI viruses, asymptomatic or mild illness of avian influenza A virus 
infections would appear in humans but rarely leads to fatal disease [45, 46]. LPAI 
viruses suddenly have changed virulence to HPAI viruses and caused severe disease 
and deaths among poultry like the emergence of H5N1 virus being in consequent to 
human epidemic [14]. Increased virulence from LPAI to HPAI following antigenic 
shift could not be predicted before the happening. Avian influenza A viruses need to 
acquire the abilities to transmit to new host species and replicate effectively in new 
host before an epidemic or pandemic [7]. Antigenic shift in avian viruses has trans-
mitted the abilities of transferring from poultry to humans and replicating progeny in 
humans by accumulated mutations in HA, NA, PB2, NS1, etc. but has not transmitted 
the abilities of transferring from human to human [28–38].
3.2  Possibility of intermediate hosts or mixing vessels for the generation for 
pandemic influenza viruses
Avian has α2–3-linked sialic acids, human has α2–6-linked sialic acids, and 
swine has both types of receptor for HA of influenza A viruses [80]. These enable 
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pigs to be susceptible to both human and avian influenza viruses. If a human 
influenza A virus infection and an avian influenza A virus infection happened 
simultaneously in swine, antigenic shift may produce new pandemic viruses which 
can be transmitted easily from person to person among human population with 
little or no immune response to them. In China, avian-like H1N1 and novel reas-
sortant H1N2 influenza viruses from pigs were reported [81]. The swine H1N1 virus 
(A/swine/Zhejiang/1/07) was close to avian-like H1N1 viruses which is seemed to 
be derived from the European swine H1N1 viruses, and the two H1N2 viruses (A/
swine/Shanghai/1/07 and A/swine/Guangxi/13/06) were novel reassortant H1N2 
influenza viruses containing genes from the classical swine (HA, NP, M, and NS), 
human (NA and PB1), and avian (PB2 and PA) lineage, which indicated that the 
reassortment of influenza viruses happened among humans, avian, and swine 
and the generation of new viruses was produced in swine [81]. In the analysis of 
influenza virus H1N1 pdm in 2009, the main persistent pdm/09-origin reassortant 
forms had at least five pdm/09-origin internal genes, and their surface genes were 
primarily of European avian-like (EA) or human H3N2-like swine influenza virus 
[82] (Figure 1). The monitor for a new pandemic virus is necessary to monitor 
and survey the epidemic infection in swine, in addition to monitoring of endemic 
LPAI infections among wild birds and poultry, epidemic LPAI and HPAI infections 
among wilds birds and poultry, and the following human infections by LPAI and 
HPAI viruses.
4.  Systemic monitor and approach for a new information of epidemic 
and pandemic infections
Avian influenza viral infections are wide ranges of mammalians, and it is not 
enough to monitor avian, swine, and humans for covering all types of avian influ-
enza virus infection because of the rare case appearance of the LPAI outbreak in 
cats in the USA [74]. The World Health Organization (WHO) continuously moni-
tors avian and other zoonotic influenza viruses closely through its Global Influenza 
Surveillance and Response System (GISRS) (http://www.who.int/influenza/
gisrslaboratory/en/). From this site, necessary information about occurrence of 
outbreaks, conditions, widespread of infections, etc. can be investigated and 
gathered. But insufficient monitor for zoonotic influenza infections as potential to 
Figure 1. 
Reassortant H1N2 influenza viruses and H1N1 pdm 2009 in swine.
Viruses
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the human pandemic is reinforced by the information from the collaboration with 
the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) (www.oie,int/) and the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) (www.fao.org/home/en/). In each country, the 
national disease center monitors its own country and internationally collaborates 
with the WHO. Monitoring reinforces the environmental barriers by noticing 
abnormal wild birds’ deaths in a province to the provincial and national authorities 
in an early stage of an endemic. Following this information, provincial authorities 
would start to investigate etiology of birds’ deaths and any other birds’ deaths 
around this area and water pollution by avian influenza viruses in ponds if avian 
influenza viruses caused birds’ deaths. Environmental barriers have three steps 
which are composed of a first step of transmission from waterfowl to poultry, a 
second step of transmission of individuals among poultry, and a third step of 
transmission from poultry to humans (Figure 2). When a first step of environmen-
tal barrier from wild birds to poultry is surmounted by avian influenza viruses, two 
patterns of damage in poultry (asymptomatic/mild disease or severe disease/
deaths) are recognized. It is very difficult to detect early and diagnose asymptom-
atic infections in poultry, but any changes in poultry including coughing and 
decrease numbers of egg production should not be missed. Recently rapid influenza 
diagnostic tests (RIDTs) are available in testing for avian influenza viruses (H5, H7, 
and H9), but other RIDTs for detection of more HA subtypes are desirable to be 
developed in demand [83]. If any doubt for avian influenza infection, RIDTs are 
recommended to be applied immediately within the limits of lower sensitivity than 
RT-PCR and other methods. A combination of RIDTs (infection of avian influenza 
viruses), RT-PCR (viral genes sequence and subtypes), HA inhibition test (viral 
subtype), ELISA (all subtypes of avian influenza viruses and widespread of viral 
infection), and the inoculation of isolated viruses to chicken (identification of  
viral pathogeny) would be adapted without any time consumption for diagnosis. 
These tests may provide an initial measure and further measures for control of an 
endemic, epidemic, and a potential pandemic infection of avian viruses. A second 
step of environmental barrier is reinforced by using the following measures: 
isolation of birds from the others, the use of personal protection equipment (PPEs) 
Figure 2. 
Comparison WHO Pandemic Phase and biological and environmental barriers step ladder.
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by farm workers, and culling the affected birds. But widespread of avian viral 
infections among poultry is not necessary for a long time. So it is desirable to 
diagnose avian viral infection in the shortest time since the first notification of 
disease by these diagnostic tests. Vaccination of poultry has been applied for the 
prevention from economic damage of culling and a potential pandemic, as biologi-
cal barriers [84]. But vaccines of animals for avian viral infections would be desired 
to high efficacy and prevalence use in the areas. Considering the negative effect for 
the difficulty of conducting surveillance for persistence of the virus after vaccina-
tion or insufficient immune response in birds leading to the latent viral infection in 
poultry, vaccination should carefully be adapted as one component of control 
measures [84]. Control strategies and measures including technical guidelines for 
pandemic potential are available from FAO and OIE [84, 85]. It is emphasized that 
the surveillance standards and methodology are necessary for calling rapid response 
for containment or mitigation of emerging infectious disease of avian influenza but 
not a system for rapid detection of emerging novel influenza strains or outbreaks of 
disease [85]. Sentinel surveillance is desired to protect poultry and humans from 
the threat of epidemic and/or pandemic potential in the prevalence of avian viruses 
among wild birds and poultry. Collapse of a third step of environmental barrier is 
recognized as human infection with avian influenza viruses. This condition is called 
as pandemic phase 2 in the WHO pandemic phase descriptions [86] (Figure 2). 
Human infection primarily may appear in direct or indirect exposure to infected 
live or dead poultry or contaminated environments, such as live bird markets. And 
human infection also may appear concerning slaughtering, de-feathering, handling 
carcasses of infected poultry, and preparing poultry for consumption, especially in 
household settings [87]. Surveillance of avian viral infections in these persons will 
be done by applying combinations of diagnostic methods as soon as possible from 
the onset of the first poultry infections. Consumption of prepared poultry and raw 
egg dishes has been reported to be linked with the infection of H5N1 human cases 
[87]. The virus is inactivated at temperatures (at least 70°C the center of the 
product) in conventional cooking, and consumption of properly cooked poultry 
and eggs should be recommended [88]. Although human-to-human transmission 
of avian influenza viruses may occur in the close and/or prolonged contact with the 
patients, there has been no sustained human-to-human transmission of these 
viruses identified [89]. But in North America in 2009, influenza A (H1N1) pdm 009 
virus originated from swine influenza viruses surmounted biological barriers. It 
took only a few months to amount to a total number of 73 affected countries and 
more than 26,000 laboratory-confirmed infected cases from the first case in Mexico 
in February of 2009 which is called as pandemic phase 6 (Figure 2) [90]. These 
suggested how fast infections had been spread in the world and how difficult to 
control the widespread of emerging infectious disease (EID) after the new emerg-
ing avian influenza virus had obtained the capacity of the interhuman transmission. 
In this phase, therapy for patients and adaptation of control measures for pandemic 
were necessary. Antiviral drugs for influenza viral infections except adamantanes 
are effective for avian influenza infections in the early stage of infection for the 
decrease of mortality rate [91]. Administration of neuraminidase inhibitors (NAIs) 
to infected persons within 48 hours of onset would be recommended, and isolation 
of infected people from the public would be important in a limited term. Recently 
baloxavir marboxil that prevents replication by inhibiting the cap-dependent 
endonuclease activity of the viral polymerase and is effective for seasonal influenza 
and avian influenza virus infections is available in Japan [92]. In addition to NAIs, it 
may be one of the powerful tools as antiviral therapy. In the pre-pandemic stage to 
the pandemic stage, network information and control measures from the national 
disease center, the Global Influenza Surveillance Network (GISN), Global Outbreak 
Viruses
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and Alert Network (GOARN), and the original network for influenza viral infection 
in province. In usual diagnosis and treatment of influenza viral infection, RIDTs are 
a useful step-up strategy for the treatment of influenza viral infections regardless of 
limiting sensitivity. RIDTs for seasonal influenza viral infection can only detect A 
type and/or B type of viral HA but not subtypes of HA strains. But these tests 
recognize human and avian influenza viral strains (H1N1, H2N3, H3N8, H4N6, 
H5N2, H6N2, H7N7, H8N4, H9N2, H10N7, H11N6, H12N6, H13N6, H14N5, H15N8, 
H16N3, H5N1, H5N6, H5N8, H7N1, N7 N7, and H7N9) as influenza type A viral 
infections (Tauns Inc.). By the results of these tests, and then if an antiviral therapy 
for influenza viral infection would be applied to patients. And then if an antiviral 
therapy is judged as not to be effective by the evaluation for the time of alleviation 
of fever in humans with influenza viral infections, further investigation for compli-
cations of viral infections, a new emerging viral infection using RIDTs for HA 
sub-strains, RT-PCR and/or viral cell culture, or mutant viruses resistant to antiviral 
drugs [13, 93]. In the pandemic phases 4–6, there may be many patients with 
influenza viral infection. It is very important to minimize the severe fatal disease 
from HPAI or LPAI infections and to select and send the patients with severe disease 
to the hospitals under the capacities for admission effectively by the triage between 
mild disease and severe disease. So this system may enable an early intervention of 
viral infections within 48 hours from onset and less numbers of patients with severe 
disease. It is not necessary to divide seasonal viral infection treatment from LPAI 
infection treatment except the necessity of special training and area for protection 
of widespread of EID using PPE. Like in the case with LPAI H6N1 virus in Taiwan 
[77], LPAI viral infections may be treated without identification in the circum-
stance of avian viral widespread among domestic birds. As one of the control points 
for pandemic preparedness, the candidate pandemic vaccine is desired and planned 
to be developed for prophylaxis and the most effective one of the control measures. 
The WHO has developed the influenza candidate vaccine viruses (CVVs) which are 
planned to be supplied to national authorities for pilot lot vaccine production, 
clinical trials, and other pandemic preparedness purposes based on their assessment 
of public health risk and need (contact at gisrs-whohq@who.int) [94]. Effective 
pandemic vaccines may be the most powerful measures for pandemic.
5. Conclusion
Pandemic is unpredictable, but sequential efforts to minimize and diminish 
the vulnerability of human public health from pandemic are desired in the world. 
Sentinel monitor and surveillance for endemic, epidemic, and pandemic potential 
is necessary for early detection of pandemic potential and pandemic preparedness 
planning. Sequential diagnosis and treatment from seasonal to avian influenza 
viruses adapted to humans may be beneficial in decreasing the risk of pandemic 
potential derived from zoonotic influenza virus infections. Preparations and devel-
opments of the candidate vaccine for the information following sequential monitor 
are necessary for the control against the phase of pre-pandemic and pandemic by 
avian influenza virus. The diverse of using several types of anti-influenza viral 
drugs with single and/or combinations for the pandemic infections would be desir-
able to be established as possible as a pandemic will be happen.
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